Extensive games are tools largely used in economics to describe decision processes of a community of agents. In this paper we propose a formal presentation based on the proof assistant Coq which focuses mostly on infinite extensive games and their characteristics. Coq proposes a feature called "dependent types", which means that the type of an object may depend on the type of its components. For instance, the set of choices or the set of utilities of an agent may depend on the agent herself. Using dependent types, we describe formally a very general class of games and strategy profiles, which corresponds somewhat to what game theorists are used to. We also discuss the notions of infiniteness in game theory and how this can be precisely described.
Introduction
Extensive games are used in formalization of economics and in decision processes. An adequate description of the decision process requires the framework to be infinite. Indeed there is no reason to assume that the process is a priori finite, since if we do so we put strong constraints on the model which prevents some behaviors, like for instance escalation. Beware in the framework of games where agents interact, we do not say that the world is infinite, but we say that the agents believe that the world is infinite. Saying that the model is finite precludes the phenomenon of escalation, and proving, in that case, that escalation cannot exist is begging the question. In this paper, by using dependent types, we revise previous works by the author [14, 11, 13] . Thus we allow considering formal presentations of very general classes of games, for instance, games with very general sets of choices depending on agents. For instance, an agent may have an infinity of choices and another may have only one choice, or two, whereas utilities are just ordered sets, even completely trivial ones in some counterexamples, which shows their generality. Similarly agents may have their own sets of utility. Agents may prefer flowers for their colors whereas agents use their fragrances. By very small changes in the formalism, we may easily describe multistage games, that are games in which agents move simultaneously at each stage.
All the formalism has been developed in Coq [2] . The reader can find scripts on GitHub [23] at https://github.com/PierreLescanne/DependentTypesForExtensiveGames.
The paper has 8 sections. The second section presents games and strategy profiles. Section 3, Section 4 and Section 6 talk about concepts connected with finiteness whereas Section 7 is about multistage games. Section 8 considers the way infiniteness is addressed in books on game theory. Section 9 is the conclusion.
Games and Strategy Profiles
This presentation of extensive games differs from this of [14, 11, 13, 1] in the use of dependant types. Indeed, for simplicity, in those papers, only binary games were considered 1 , that is that only two choices were offered to the agents. In this paper, using dependent types, we can propose a more general framework. Associated with a game, a strategy profile is a description of the choices taken by the agents. The formal definitions of games and strategy profiles relies on three entities, a set of agents written Agent, a set of choices depending on an agent a written Choice a and a set of utilities depending on an agent a written Utility a. Moreover there is a preorder on Utility a. In particular, unlike most of the presentations of games, utilities need not be natural numbers, but can be any ordered set used by the agent. The sets of infinite games and of infinite strategy profiles are defined coinductively and are written respectively Game and StratProf.
Game.
A game which does not correspond to a terminal position and which we call a node is written <|a,next|> and has two arguments:
• an agent a, the agent whom the node belongs to,
• a function next of type Choice a → Game.
We call leaf a terminal position. A leaf consists in a function (∀ a:Agent, Utility a) → Game which is the utility assignment at the end of the game and which is written <| f |>. Notice that the utility depends on the agent. A node game is made of an agent and of a function which returns a game given a choice. Assume that the agent is a and the function is next, then a node game is written <|a,next|>. The formal definition of a game is given in Coq by:
CoInductive Game : Set := | gLeaf : (forall a:Agent, Utility a) -> Game | gNode : forall (a:Agent), (Choice a -> Game) -> Game.
Strategy profile.
A strategy profile which corresponds to a non terminal position and which we call a node is written a,c,next and has three components:
• a choice c, which is the choice taken by agent on this specific node,
• a function next of type Choice a → StratProf.
A strategy profile which is a terminal position is a function The two main differences with the approach of [14, 11, 13, 1] lie in the fact that the set of choices and the set of utilities are not fixed (the same for all agents, namely a pair) but depend on the agent (dependent type). This way we can describe a larger class of games. For instance, as we will see in Section 4 the sets of choices can easily be infinite. Since the built-in Coq equality is not adequate, we define coinductively an equality on games, further written ==.
Utility assignment.
Since Coq accepts only terminating functions we define the utility assignment as a relation:
Inductive Uassign : StratProf -> (forall a:Agent, Utility a) -> Prop := | UassignLeaf: forall f, Uassign (<<f>>) f | UassignNode: forall (a:Agent)(c:Choice a) (ua: forall a',Utility a') (next:Choice a -> StratProf), Uassign (next c) ua -> Uassign (<<a,c,next>>) ua.
We prove that Uassign is a functional relation, namely that forall s ua va, Uassign s ua -> Uassign s va -> ua=va..
Notice that for proving this property we need an inversion tactic which is somewhat subtle when dealing with dependent types [4, 15] .
2 Moreover for all convergent strategy profiles (i.e., for all strategy profiles of interest, see next section) we can prove that the function is total, i.e., that there exists always a utility assignment associated with this convergent strategy profile.
Several notions associated with finiteness
On infinite games and strategy profiles there are several predicates capturing notions of finiteness.
Finite Games.
A game is finite if it has a finite number of positions. It is naturally an inductive 3 . Clearly a leaf is finite. A game which is a node is finite if for all choices, the next games are finite. This is made precise by the following definition. Games with only finitely many strategy profiles.
Osborne and Rubinstein [17] call "finite", a game with only finitely many strategy profiles 4 . In order not to interfere with the previous definition, we prefer to say that the game is finitely broad.
5 This is translated by the fact that for a game g to have only finitely many strategy profiles, there shall exist a list that collects all the strategy profiles that have this game g as underlying game. Since in Coq lists are finite this yields the desired property:
Definition FinitelyBroad (g:Game): Prop := exists (l: list StratProf), forall (s:StratProf), game s == g <-> In s l.
Games with only finite histories.
A game has only finite histories if it has only finitely many paths (histories) from the root to the leaves. This can be described as follows: Those games should not be confused with games with finite horizon. Notice that Osborne and Rubinstein [17] require a game with a finite horizon to have only finitely many strategy profiles (p. 90: "[Given a finite game] if the longest history is finite then the game has finite horizon"), whereas Osborne [16] does not require the set of strategy profiles associated to the game to be finite (see Section 8) . For strategy profiles we have: 4 Actually they use the concept of "history" (path), instead of strategy profiles, but this is not essential. 5 Denoted by the predicate FinitelyBroad on Game in Coq Convergent strategy profiles.
Convergence can be seen as an extension to strategy profiles of the finiteness of histories. The finiteness does not apply to all paths (histories) leading to leaves, but applies only to paths corresponding to the choices of the agents. Mutatis mutandi, the expression The reader may notice the similarity of that definition with this of finite histories for games. We are now able to prove a theorem on the totality of Uassign:
Lemma ExistenceUassign: forall (s:StratProf)(a:Agent), (Convergent s) -> exists (u:Utility), Uassign s a u.
Convergence is extended to all the strategy subprofiles by a modality Always, abbreviated , when used in expressions. Always P s means that P is fulfilled by all subprofiles of s.
CoInductive Always (P:StratProf -> Prop) : StratProf -> Prop := | AlwaysLeaf : forall f, Always P (<<f>>) | AlwaysNode : forall (a:Agent)(c:Choice a) (next:Choice a->StratProf), P (<<a,c,next>>) -> (forall c', Always P (next c')) -> Always P (<<a,c,next>>).
The predicate Always Convergent is shortened in ⇓. ⇓ s means that s is convergent and also all subprofiles are convergent. It plays a main role in the definition of the other concepts related to strategy profiles, namely equilibria and escalation. Always convergent strategy profiles are the right objects, that game theorists are interested in. "Always Convergence" captures the notion of continuity in the spirit of Brouwer [3] . 6 4 A game with only finite histories and no longest history
In this section we show how Coq can be used to prove formally properties about games. Specifically we give an example of a game with only finite histories and no longest history as a counterexample to Osborne (see [16] p. 157) definition of finite horizon. The game has two agents whom we call Alice and Bob and its definition uses a feature of dependent types, namely that the choices may depend on the agent. In this case, Alice has infinitely many choices, namely the set nat of natural numbers and Bob has one choice, namely the set unit.
The utility of Alice and Bob are meaningless since they are singletons, namely the Coq built-in unit which contains the only element tt. In Coq we have:
Definition Choice :(AliceBob -> Set) := fun a:AliceBob => match a with Alice => nat | Bob => unit end.
and
Definition Utility: AliceBob -> Set := fun a => unit.
Notice that Choice and Utility are functions which take an agent and return a set. Said otherwise, the set of choices is the result of the function Choice applied to agents and the set of utilities is the result of the function Utility applied to agents. If the agent is Alice, the set of choices is nat and the set of utility is unit. If the agent is Bob the set of choices and the set of utilities are unit (a singleton). In other words, the set of choices depends on the agents, the set of utilities which looks depending on the agents, but doesn't. The game has infinitely many threadlike subgames of length n:
Fixpoint ThreadlikeGame (n:nat): (Game AliceBob Choice Utility) := match n with | 0 => <|fun (a:AliceBob) => match a with | Alice => tt | Bob => tt end|> | (S n) => <|Bob,fun c:Choice Bob => match c with tt=>ThreadlikeGame n end|> end.
The game we are interested in is called GameWFH and is defined as a node with agent Alice and with next games ThreadlikeGame n for Alice's choice n:
Definition GameWFH:(Game AliceBob Choice Utility) := <| Alice, fun n:Choice Alice => ThreadlikeGame n |>.
Let us call triv the utility assignment Alice => tt, Bob => tt. We can picture GameWFH like in Figure 1 . One can prove that ThreadlikeGame n has only finite histories:
Proposition FiniteHistoryGameWFH: FiniteHistoryGame AliceBob Choice Utility GameWFH.
Clearly GameWFH has no longest history. 
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
An agent is rational if her strategy is based on a strategy profile which is a subgame perfect equilibrium. So let us present subgame perfect equilibria. Subgame perfect equilibria are specific strategy profiles that fulfill some "good" properties. Therefore they are presented by a predicate which we call SPE. In Coq this is a function of type StratProf -> Prop. A strategy profile, which is a node, is a subgame perfect equilibrium if first it is always convergent. This is necessary to be able to compute the utility assignment. Moreover the choice of the agent is better or equal to other choices w.r.t. to the utility assignment and all the strategy subprofiles of this strategy profile are themselves subgame perfect equilibria. A leaf is always a subgame perfect equilibrium. This can be formalized in Coq: 
The simplest escalation
We discussed already the rationality of escalation in infinite games [14, 13] . For dependent choice games, escalation is a somewhat simple concept and consists in adjusting the types. The simplest escalation is probably as follows. It may occur in a game in which there are two agents Alice and Bob, where each agent has two choices down and right and in which there are two non ordered utilities ying and yang. We use ying and yang to insist on the fact that there is no need for numbers and no need for an actual order among the utility values.
Ù Ù ying,yang yang,ying ying,yang yang,ying ying,yang yang,ying ying,yang This is basically the game studied in [13] , with the difference that the preference in Utility = {ying, yang} is just the equality. In other words, agents do not need to prefer one item over the other, just a trivial preference may lead to an escalation. The agents are like Buridan's ass [22] , they may not know what to choose and therefore go forever. This may look strange, but as shown by the Coq script, the proof is based on exactly the same technique of the proof of the rationality of the escalation of the dollar auction [20] as shown by the two following Coq statements and proofs, 7 namely the proof of the escalation for the dollar auction: 
Multistage games
In [6] , Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole present multistage games. They are games in which all the agents move simultaneously at each stage. Yet this can be easily formalized using dependant types and products, more precisely, the type: A node has one component namely, next: forall a: Agent, Choice a and is written <· next ·> in order to distinguish it from <| f |> which is the notation for leaf similar to this of games defined in Section 2. Let us compare the types of next. In extensive games (Section 2) next has type Choice a -> Game. In multistage games, as we said, next has type Multistage strategy profiles are written respectively <<<f>>> and <<<c,next>>.
The utility assignment for a multistage strategy profile is defined like for extensive games:
Inductive Uassign : MSStratProf -> Agent -> Utility -> Prop := | UassignLeaf: forall a f, Uassign (<<<f>>>) a (f a) | UassignNode: forall (a:Agent)(c: forall a', Choice a') (u:Utility) (next:(forall a', Choice a') -> MSStratProf), Uassign (next c) a u -> Uassign (<<<c,next>>>) a u.
We are currently working on proving that unistage games (of Section 2) can be injected one to one in multistage games.
Infinite and infinite
In this section, we look at the way infiniteness is dealt with in textbooks on game theory.
Two views of infiniteness
Infiniteness is discussed by Poincaré in his book Science et méthode [18] , where he distinguishes mathematical infinite which we would call today potential infinite, and actual infinite. Poincaré did not believe in such an actual infinite, but today we do accept a concept of actual infinite which is the foundation of the theory of coinduction and infinite games. Let us discuss these two concepts in the case of words on the alphabet {a, b}. {a, b} + represents all the (finite) words made with the letters a and b, like a, b, aa, ab, ba, bb, aaa, aab, aba, abb, baa, bab, bba, bbb, etc. One can also write:
{a, b} + is the least fixpoint of the equation:
There are infinitely many such words. This is a first kind of infinite, indeed we can build words of all finite lengths. {a, b} ω is the set of infinite words. Each infinite word can be seen as a function N → {a, b}. An infinite word represents another kind of infinite. For instance the infinite word ababab... or (ab) ω corresponds to the function if even(n) then a else b and is a typical example of actual infinite. {a, b} ω is solution of the fixpoint equation:
In {a, b} + there is no infinite objects, but only approximations, whereas in {a, b} ω there are only infinite objects. Figure 2 represents the two notions of infiniteness. On the left, the vault ceiling of Nasir ol Molk Mosque in Chiraz 8 pictures potential infiniteness. On the right, a drawing 9 inspired by M.C. Escher Waterfall pictures actual infiniteness.
Common Knowledge.
Common Knowledge is a central concept in game theory, it relies on the concept of knowledge of an agent, which is a modality i.e., an operator of modal logic.
10
Modality K a (knowledge of agent a) follows the laws of modal logic S 5 . For this and the group G of agents, we create a modality E G (shared knowledge):
8 From Wikimedia, due to User:Pentocelo. 9 From Wikimedia. 10 We follows the presentation of [10, 12] , which took its origin from [5] . The common knowledge modality is
Usually there is no ambiguity on the group of agents, thus instead C G and E G one write just C and E. Clearly C has the flavor of + as shown by the analogy between the equation (1) and the equation (2) and their fixpoint definitions.
Infinite and fixpoint.
Infinite objects are associated with fixpoints. For instance, {a, b} + is the least fixpoint of the equation: X = {a, b} ∪ {a, b}X whereas C(ϕ) is the least fixpoint of X ⇔ ϕ ∧ E(X).
which means that C(ϕ) is a solution:
C(ϕ) ⇔ ϕ ∧ E(C(ϕ)).
Infinite in textbooks.
In general in textbooks on game theory "infinite" is a vague notion which in not defined precisely and words like "ad infinitum" ( [6] p. 542, [8] p. 27) or "infinite regress" ([6] p. 543) or three dots are used. It is often said that infinite games resemble repeated games, but this is not true, since repeated games are typically potential infinite presentations of infinite games, i.e., approximationonly sequences of games are considered, not their limit -whereas infinite games are defined by coinduction.
Two main mistakes are worth noticing.
• In [8] , Hargreaves and Varoufakis define common knowledge as follows: . . . and son on ad infinitum.
but they add "The idea reminds one of what happens when a camera is pointing to a television screen that conveys the image recorded by the very same camera : an infinite self-reflection", showing that they clearly mixed up the two kinds of notions. Indeed clearly the infinite self-reflection illustrates an actual infinite, a little like the infinite word (ab) ω or the Escher waterfall, whereas, as we said, common knowledge is a potential infinite. An expression like ad libitum should have been preferred and the image of a swing going further and further or a tessellation, like this of Figure 2 should have been more appropriate.
• In [16] , Osborne uses the "length of longest terminal history" to define finite horizon, without checking whether this longest history actually exists. A counterexample is shown in Section 4. We gather that he means the "least upper bound on N of the lengths of the histories".
